subset of small-order Ed25519 vectors is failing in WPTs

[avivkeller]

I've been working on upgrading the Web Platform Tests in PR #54468, but I'm running into an issue with the WebCryptoAPI tests failing. After investigating, I found that I could reproduce the problem in Node.js. The error seems to be related to the crypto.subtle API, which isn't producing the expected results when verifying data in Ed25519.

FWIW Node.js isn't the only runtime per https://wpt.fyi/results/WebCryptoAPI/sign_verify/eddsa.https.any.html?label=experimental&label=master&aligned

The original error from running the Web Platform Tests is:

[UNEXPECTED_FAILURE][FAIL] Ed25519 Verification checks with small-order key of order - Test 0
assert_equals: Signature verification result. expected false but got true
    at Test.<anonymous> (/test/fixtures/wpt/WebCryptoAPI/sign_verify/eddsa.js:235:15)
Command: /out/Release/node  /test/wpt/test-webcrypto.js 'sign_verify/eddsa.https.any.js'

[UNEXPECTED_FAILURE][FAIL] Ed25519 Verification checks with small-order key of order - Test 1
assert_equals: Signature verification result. expected false but got true
    at Test.<anonymous> (/test/fixtures/wpt/WebCryptoAPI/sign_verify/eddsa.js:235:15)
Command: /out/Release/node  /test/wpt/test-webcrypto.js 'sign_verify/eddsa.https.any.js'

[UNEXPECTED_FAILURE][FAIL] Ed25519 Verification checks with small-order key of order - Test 2
assert_equals: Signature verification result. expected false but got true
    at Test.<anonymous> (/test/fixtures/wpt/WebCryptoAPI/sign_verify/eddsa.js:235:15)
Command: /out/Release/node  /test/wpt/test-webcrypto.js 'sign_verify/eddsa.https.any.js'

My minimal reproduction is:

var pubKeys = [
	[0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0xfa], // kSmallOrderPoints #5
	[0xf7, 0xba, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0xab, 0xea, 0xf6, 0x99, 0x58, 0x39, 0x92, 0x21, 0x9b, 0x7b, 0x22, 0x3f, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0x19, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0x7c, 0x55, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x43], // highest 32 bytes of case "1" signature
	[0xec, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff], // kSmallOrderPoints #9
	[0xEC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F], // kSmallOrderPoints #1
]

const tests = [{
	id: "0", // S = 0 | A's order = small | R's order = small | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x8c, 0x93, 0x25, 0x5d, 0x71, 0xdc, 0xab, 0x10, 0xe8, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x62, 0x00, 0xf3, 0xc7, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x09, 0xd9, 0xbc, 0x30, 0x68, 0xd3, 0xef, 0x4e, 0xde, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x30, 0x22, 0xb6]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[0]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0x7a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]),
	verified: false,  // small-order signature's R fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "1", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x9b, 0xd9, 0xf4, 0x4f, 0x4d, 0xcc, 0x75, 0xbd, 0x53, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xb2, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0x8f, 0xc1, 0xcd, 0x6d, 0x12, 0x30, 0xe1, 0x48, 0x61, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xde, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x79]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[0]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xf7, 0xba, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0xab, 0xea, 0xf6, 0x99, 0x58, 0x39, 0x92, 0x21, 0x9b, 0x7b, 0x22, 0x3f, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0x19, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0x7c, 0x55, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x43, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false, // small-order key's data fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "2", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = small | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0xae, 0xbf, 0x3f, 0x26, 0x01, 0xa0, 0xc8, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0xd8, 0x91, 0x16, 0x42, 0xf7, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x68, 0x21, 0x8d, 0xa8, 0x47, 0x17, 0x72, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x9d, 0x35, 0xb9, 0xab]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[1]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x4b, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xec, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0xb9, 0x7b, 0xc1, 0x0a, 0xc2, 0x7a, 0xc8, 0x75, 0x1a, 0x7d, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0xf8, 0xb9, 0x53, 0xec, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x33, 0xca, 0x26, 0x0e]),
	verified: false,  // small-order signature's R fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "11", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small (non-canonical) | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ? Implementations that reduce A before hashing will accept #10 and accept #11, and viceversa
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x39, 0xa5, 0x91, 0xf5, 0x32, 0x1b, 0xbe, 0x07, 0xfd, 0x5a, 0x23, 0xdc, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xd0, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x45, 0x26, 0x61, 0x57, 0x46, 0x72, 0x7c, 0xee, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x82, 0xae, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x6f]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[2]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false, // non-canonical point should fail in the verificaton (RFC8032)
},
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244.pdf#section.A.2
// cases breaking non-repudiation
{
	id: "12", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ?
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x20, 0x55, 0x53, 0x44, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[3]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false,
},
{
	id: "13", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ?
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x20, 0x55, 0x53, 0x44, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[3]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false,
}
]

const algorithm = { name: "Ed25519" };

for (let i = 0; i < tests.length; i++) {
	const test = tests[i];
	const publicKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", test.keyData, algorithm, false, ["verify"]);
	const isVerified = await crypto.subtle.verify(algorithm, publicKey, test.signature, test.message);
	console.log(test.id, isVerified === test.verified);
  }

Modified from https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/blob/master/WebCryptoAPI/sign_verify/eddsa.js. I've excluded the passing tests.

Results:

(node:73243) ExperimentalWarning: The Ed25519 Web Crypto API algorithm is an experimental feature and might change at any time
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0 false
1 false
2 false
11 false
12 false
13 false

Expand for a version with all tests, including passing ones

var pubKeys = [
	[0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0xfa], // kSmallOrderPoints #5
	[0xf7, 0xba, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0xab, 0xea, 0xf6, 0x99, 0x58, 0x39, 0x92, 0x21, 0x9b, 0x7b, 0x22, 0x3f, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0x19, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0x7c, 0x55, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x43], // highest 32 bytes of case "1" signature
	[0xcd, 0xb2, 0x67, 0xce, 0x40, 0xc5, 0xcd, 0x45, 0x30, 0x6f, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xf2, 0x97, 0x31, 0x45, 0x93, 0x87, 0xdb, 0xf9, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0xd5, 0xae, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x4d],
	[0x44, 0x2a, 0xad, 0x9f, 0x08, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0xe1, 0x46, 0x47, 0xb1, 0xef, 0x90, 0x99, 0xa1, 0xff, 0x47, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x85, 0x89, 0xe6, 0x6f, 0x28, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x9c, 0x11, 0xf5, 0x82, 0xa6, 0x23],
	[0xec, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff], // kSmallOrderPoints #9
	[0xEC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F], // kSmallOrderPoints #1
]

const tests = [{
	id: "0", // S = 0 | A's order = small | R's order = small | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x8c, 0x93, 0x25, 0x5d, 0x71, 0xdc, 0xab, 0x10, 0xe8, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x62, 0x00, 0xf3, 0xc7, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x09, 0xd9, 0xbc, 0x30, 0x68, 0xd3, 0xef, 0x4e, 0xde, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x30, 0x22, 0xb6]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[0]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0x7a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]),
	verified: false,  // small-order signature's R fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "1", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x9b, 0xd9, 0xf4, 0x4f, 0x4d, 0xcc, 0x75, 0xbd, 0x53, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xb2, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0x8f, 0xc1, 0xcd, 0x6d, 0x12, 0x30, 0xe1, 0x48, 0x61, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xde, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x79]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[0]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xf7, 0xba, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0xab, 0xea, 0xf6, 0x99, 0x58, 0x39, 0x92, 0x21, 0x9b, 0x7b, 0x22, 0x3f, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0x19, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0x7c, 0x55, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x43, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false, // small-order key's data fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "2", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = small | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0xae, 0xbf, 0x3f, 0x26, 0x01, 0xa0, 0xc8, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0xd8, 0x91, 0x16, 0x42, 0xf7, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x68, 0x21, 0x8d, 0xa8, 0x47, 0x17, 0x72, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x9d, 0x35, 0xb9, 0xab]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[1]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xc7, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x67, 0x0f, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x53, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x92, 0xac, 0x03, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x4b, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xec, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0xb9, 0x7b, 0xc1, 0x0a, 0xc2, 0x7a, 0xc8, 0x75, 0x1a, 0x7d, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0xf8, 0xb9, 0x53, 0xec, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x33, 0xca, 0x26, 0x0e]),
	verified: false,  // small-order signature's R fail in the verification.
},
{
	id: "3", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = mixed | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x9b, 0xd9, 0xf4, 0x4f, 0x4d, 0xcc, 0x75, 0xbd, 0x53, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xb2, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0x8f, 0xc1, 0xcd, 0x6d, 0x12, 0x30, 0xe1, 0x48, 0x61, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xde, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x79]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[2]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0x90, 0x46, 0xa6, 0x47, 0x50, 0x44, 0x49, 0x38, 0xde, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xbb, 0x80, 0x48, 0x5e, 0x92, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x06, 0xc1, 0x60, 0x48, 0x4c, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xc1, 0x85, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x14, 0x42, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0x1d, 0x62, 0xe9, 0xf2, 0x2f, 0x3d, 0x3a, 0xd7, 0x80, 0x2d, 0xb0, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0x88, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0x66, 0x48, 0xa9, 0x8b, 0xd0, 0x09]),
	verified: true, // mixed-order points are not checked.
},
{
	id: "4", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = mixed | (1) = pass | (2) = fail
	message: Uint8Array.from([0xe4, 0x7d, 0x62, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0x33, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xf5, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xec, 0x40, 0x11, 0xea, 0xcc, 0xd5, 0x5b, 0x53, 0xf5, 0x6c]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[2]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0x16, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x9c, 0x02, 0x58, 0xcd, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0xa8, 0x78, 0xbc, 0xb1, 0x92, 0x5f, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x24, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x17, 0x96, 0xbe, 0xd5, 0x12, 0x5e, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0x98, 0x2a, 0x26, 0x9b, 0x72, 0x3e, 0x06, 0x68, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x91, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x6a, 0x58, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x25, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xab, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x79, 0x40, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x09]),
	verified: false, // expect a cofactorless verification algorithm.
},
{
	id: "5", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = L | (1) = pass | (2) = fail
	message: Uint8Array.from([0xe4, 0x7d, 0x62, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0x33, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xf5, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xec, 0x40, 0x11, 0xea, 0xcc, 0xd5, 0x5b, 0x53, 0xf5, 0x6c]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[2]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0x21, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x84, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xa4, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x5b, 0x12, 0x35, 0xc8, 0x0a, 0x53, 0x78, 0x78, 0xb3, 0x8f, 0x31, 0x42, 0x35, 0x6b, 0x2c, 0x23, 0x84, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x46, 0x68, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0x0b, 0xc8, 0x36, 0xda, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x10, 0x76, 0xf9, 0xab, 0xe3, 0xa5, 0x3f, 0x9c, 0x03, 0xc1, 0xce, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xb6, 0x58, 0xd0, 0x03, 0x04, 0x94, 0xac, 0xe5, 0x86, 0x68, 0x74, 0x05]),
	verified: false, // expect a cofactorless verification algorithm.
},
{
	id: "6", // S > L | A's order = L | R's order = L | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x85, 0xe2, 0x41, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x7d, 0x62, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0x33, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xf5, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xec, 0x40]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[3]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xe9, 0x6f, 0x66, 0xbe, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x82, 0xe6, 0x01, 0x50, 0xba, 0xec, 0xff, 0x99, 0x06, 0x68, 0x4a, 0xeb, 0xb1, 0xef, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x67, 0xa7, 0x18, 0x9a, 0xc7, 0x8e, 0xa2, 0x3b, 0x6c, 0x0e, 0x54, 0x7f, 0x76, 0x90, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0xdd, 0xcd, 0x04, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x90, 0xdc, 0x19, 0xb3, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x7f, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x8c, 0xb6, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x9b, 0xa3, 0xa5, 0x14]),
	verified: false, // S out of bounds
},
{
	id: "7", // S >> L | A's order = L | R's order = L | (1) = pass | (2) = pass
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x85, 0xe2, 0x41, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x7d, 0x62, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0x33, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xf5, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xec, 0x40]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[3]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0x8c, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0x26, 0xd0, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x47, 0x95, 0x8c, 0x9e, 0x68, 0xb9, 0x37, 0x10, 0x4c, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x13, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x66, 0xac, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x8d, 0x38, 0xaa, 0x19, 0x42, 0x7e, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x8a, 0x47, 0x34, 0xe7, 0x4f, 0x2f, 0x13, 0xf0, 0x6f, 0x97, 0xc2, 0x0d, 0x58, 0xcc, 0x3f, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xbd, 0x0d, 0x27, 0x2f, 0x42, 0xb6, 0x95, 0xdd, 0x7e, 0x89, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x02]),
	verified: false, // S out of bounds
},
{
	id: "8", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = small (non-canonical) | (1) = ? | (2) = ? Implementations that reduce A before hashing will accept #8 and accept #9, and viceversa
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x9b, 0xed, 0xc2, 0x67, 0x42, 0x37, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x73, 0x88, 0x86, 0x31, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0x59, 0x88, 0xba, 0xd3, 0xdb, 0x83, 0x85, 0x1e, 0xe8, 0x5c, 0x85, 0xe2, 0x41, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x8b, 0x41]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[1]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xec, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0xbe, 0x96, 0x78, 0xac, 0x10, 0x2e, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0x2b, 0x02, 0x10, 0xbb, 0x34, 0xd7, 0x42, 0x8d, 0x12, 0xff, 0xc5, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x37, 0xe3, 0x59, 0x94, 0x12, 0x66, 0xa4, 0xe3, 0x5f, 0x0f]),
	verified: false, // non-canonical point should fail in the verificaton (RFC8032)
},
{
	id: "9", // 0 < S < L | A's order = mixed | R's order = small (non-canonical) | (1) = ? | (2) = ?
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x9b, 0xed, 0xc2, 0x67, 0x42, 0x37, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x73, 0x88, 0x86, 0x31, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0x59, 0x88, 0xba, 0xd3, 0xdb, 0x83, 0x85, 0x1e, 0xe8, 0x5c, 0x85, 0xe2, 0x41, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x8b, 0x41]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[1]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xec, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xca, 0x8c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0x20, 0x89, 0x82, 0xaa, 0x38, 0xd4, 0x93, 0x66, 0x21, 0xa4, 0x77, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x33, 0xaa, 0x05, 0x05, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xfd, 0xaa, 0x94, 0x3d, 0x49, 0x08]),
	verified: false, // non-canonical point should fail in the verificaton (RFC8032)
},
{
	id: "10", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small (non-canonical) | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ? Implementations that reduce A before hashing will accept #10 and accept #11, and viceversa
	message: Uint8Array.from([0xe9, 0x6b, 0x70, 0x21, 0xeb, 0x39, 0xc1, 0xa1, 0x63, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x93, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0xf2, 0x13, 0x87, 0xda, 0x4c, 0xc4, 0x57, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xfa, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x15, 0x5b]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[4]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false, // non-canonical point should fail in the verificaton (RFC8032)
},
{
	id: "11", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small (non-canonical) | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ? Implementations that reduce A before hashing will accept #10 and accept #11, and viceversa
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x39, 0xa5, 0x91, 0xf5, 0x32, 0x1b, 0xbe, 0x07, 0xfd, 0x5a, 0x23, 0xdc, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xd0, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x45, 0x26, 0x61, 0x57, 0x46, 0x72, 0x7c, 0xee, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x82, 0xae, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x6f]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[4]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false, // non-canonical point should fail in the verificaton (RFC8032)
},
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244.pdf#section.A.2
// cases breaking non-repudiation
{
	id: "12", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ?
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x20, 0x55, 0x53, 0x44, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[5]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false,
},
{
	id: "13", // 0 < S < L | A's order = small | R's order = mixed | (1) = ? | (2) = ?
	message: Uint8Array.from([0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x20, 0x55, 0x53, 0x44, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65]),
	keyData: Uint8Array.from(pubKeys[5]),
	signature: Uint8Array.from([0xa9, 0xd5, 0x52, 0x60, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x26, 0x1e, 0xb9, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x5e, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7a, 0x76, 0x19, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x13, 0x59, 0x63, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x47, 0x86, 0xbe, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xd3, 0xf3, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x03, 0x98, 0x4d, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0x66, 0x37, 0xb4, 0x54, 0x50, 0xac, 0x04]),
	verified: false,
}
]

const algorithm = { name: "Ed25519" };

for (let i = 0; i < tests.length; i++) {
  const test = tests[i];
  const publicKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", test.keyData, algorithm, false, ["verify"]);
  const isVerified = await crypto.subtle.verify(algorithm, publicKey, test.signature, test.message);
  console.log(test.id, isVerified === test.verified);
}

(node:77667) ExperimentalWarning: The Ed25519 Web Crypto API algorithm is an experimental feature and might change at any time
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0 false
1 false
2 false
3 true
4 true
5 true
6 true
7 true
8 true
9 true
10 true
11 false
12 false
13 false

---

CC @nodejs/crypto

[panva]

To further complicate things when you acknowledge these failures as expected then in jenkins on s390x some of those vectors actually pass. But they're not flaky.

Our results are also not that different from other implementers, see wpt.fyi.

Normally I would just acknowledge these failures myself but because on jenkins s390x some of these failures pass and that we can't dynamically set the expectations, I left WebCryptoAPI WPTs not updated.

The Curve25519 secure curves part of the WICG spec is not yet merged into WebCryptoAPI so these are in theory still tentative. And it would seem the browser vendors are not willing to implement specific checks beyond what the crypto libraries do either.

[avivkeller]

I'm happy to just skip these as expected failures, I just figured opening an issue and getting all the information would be better to do beforehand.

[panva]

You can't skip individual vectors, only the whole file, which is also not something we'd like to do.

[avivkeller]

You can't skip individual vectors, only the whole file, which is also not something we'd like to do.

IIRC you can using the fail key.

For example,

  "getRandomValues.any.js": {
    "fail": {
      "note": "These types do not exist in Node.js",
      "expected": [
        "Float16 arrays",
        "Float arrays",
        "DataView"
      ]
    }

[panva]

#54572 (comment)

Normally I would just acknowledge these failures myself but because on jenkins s390x some of these failures pass and that we can't dynamically set the expectations, I left WebCryptoAPI WPTs not updated.

You just didn't get to run full CI yet to encounter this. I did as soon as the WPTs landed.