Summary

Directus stores revision records (in directus_revisions) whenever items are created or updated. Due to the revision snapshot code not consistently calling the prepareDelta sanitization pipeline, sensitive fields (including user tokens, two-factor authentication secrets, external auth identifiers, auth data, stored credentials, and AI provider API keys) could be stored in plaintext within revision records.

Additionally, the same sensitive fields were missing from the redaction list used when Directus Flows logged operation payloads involving the directus_users collection.

Impact

Any user or service account with read access to directus_revisions (or flow logs) could retrieve values for fields that are supposed to be concealed or encrypted at rest, including:

• token, tfa_secret, external_identifier, auth_data, credentials
• ai_openai_api_key, ai_anthropic_api_key, ai_google_api_key, ai_openai_compatible_api_key

This could lead to account takeover (via stolen tokens or 2FA secrets) or unauthorized use of third-party API keys stored against users.

Affected code paths

1. Item create/update revisions The data (snapshot) field written to directus_revisions was not processed through prepareDelta, so concealed/encrypted fields were stored without redaction. Relational fields were also included, which should have been excluded.
2. Authentication service When a user was auto-suspended after repeated failed login attempts, the revision record was created with the raw user object (including all sensitive fields) rather than the sanitized delta.
3. Flows The payload redaction list used when writing flow logs was missing token, tfa_secret, external_identifier, auth_data, credentials, and the AI API key fields, causing these to be written unredacted into flow execution data.

References

• GHSA-mvv8-v4jj-g47j