fix(review): widen the gate's hard-blocking secret scan to match REES's richer ruleset

[JSONbored]

Summary

• src/review/safety.ts's secretLeakFinding() — the ALWAYS-ON, unconditional secret_leak hard blocker that fires for every repo, every PR regardless of any opt-in — only recognized 5 concrete patterns via HARD_SECRET_KINDS: github_token, github_pat, private_key_block, aws_access_key, slack_token.
• review-enrichment/src/analyzers/secret-scan.ts (feat(enrichment): gitleaks-grade secret scan analyzer with value redaction #1476) already has a richer, higher-recall rule set: Google API keys, JWTs, and a generic secret/password/token-assignment pattern. That richer scanner only fed the AI reviewer's advisory write-up (AI review off by default), never the deterministic hard blocker — so a leaked Google API key, JWT, or a plain password = "..." assignment sailed through the gate clean on every repo.

Scope

• src/review/secrets-scan.ts — widened SECRET_PATTERNS to add google_api_key and jwt (format-precise, same near-zero false-positive risk as the existing 5) plus generic_secret_assignment — the one keyword-shaped pattern, so it needs real guardrails before becoming an unconditional blocker: isPlaceholderSecretValue rejects placeholder phrases (your-, changeme, redacted, example, <...>, etc.) and low-entropy filler ("xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx") before a match counts, and the 16+ character floor already excludes short type/schema declarations like password: z.string() (no quoted literal to match at all).
• src/review/safety.ts — added the 3 new kinds to HARD_SECRET_KINDS.
• Kept this as an independent copy rather than a cross-package import: review-enrichment deploys standalone on Railway with its own tsconfig/build/test pipeline, so importing across that boundary would break its independence — the same reasoning secrets-scan.ts's own header already documents for staying self-contained relative to reviewbot.
• Did not touch src/review/content-lane/security-scan.ts, a separate self-contained copy for the unrelated content-submission feature — out of scope for this issue.
• Tests: all-new-kind positive tests plus explicit false-positive regression tests for every shape the issue calls out (schema/type declarations, placeholder/redacted values, repeated-character filler, short values under the 16-char floor).

Validation

• npx vitest run test/unit/secrets-scan.test.ts test/unit/safety-wiring.test.ts test/unit/safety.test.ts — 48/48 passing, 100% line/branch coverage on the changed files
• npm run typecheck — clean
• npm run test:ci — full local gate green
• npm audit --audit-level=moderate — 0 vulnerabilities

Safety

• No secret value is ever echoed — only kind names surface in the blocker message (unchanged from before).
• Additive-only pattern widening; the original 5 hard-blocking kinds and their behavior are byte-identical.

Closes #2553

[loopover-orb]

Warning

🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨🟨

⏸️ Gittensory review result - manual review recommended

_{Review updated: 2026-07-02 16:51:44 UTC}

4 files · 1 AI reviewer · no blockers · readiness 98/100 · CI green · clean

⏸️ Suggested Action - Manual Review

• Touches a guarded path — held for manual review

Review summary
The change correctly wires the new scanner kinds through `secretLeakFinding()` into the existing hard-block gate, and the added tests cover the main positive path plus several placeholder exclusions. The format-specific Google API key and JWT additions are straightforward. The generic assignment scanner is intentionally conservative, but its current value grammar leaves important real-world assignment forms uncovered.

Nits — 7 non-blocking

• nit: `src/review/secrets-scan.ts:42` only matches quoted generic assignment values, so common `.env`-style lines like `TOKEN=sk_live_...` stay outside the widened hard-blocking path.
• nit: `src/review/secrets-scan.ts:42` limits generic values to `[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]`, which excludes common secret characters such as `.`, `:`, `@​`, and `$` in quoted password/token assignments.
• nit: `src/review/secrets-scan.ts:47` treats any value containing placeholder words anywhere as non-secret, which is defensible but broad enough that it deserves an explicit test for a mixed value if that behavior is intentional.
• In `src/review/secrets-scan.ts:42`, consider capturing the whole quoted value with a delimiter-safe pattern instead of a narrow character class, then let `isPlaceholderSecretValue()` decide whether to suppress it.
• In `test/unit/secrets-scan.test.ts`, add explicit coverage for unquoted `.env` assignments and punctuation-bearing quoted values, either as supported cases or documented non-goals.
• PR author also opened the linked issue — Link an issue that was opened by a different contributor, or provide a rationale for why this self-authored issue represents genuine discovery work.
• Touches a guarded path — held for manual review — A maintainer must review and merge this change.

Signal	Result	Evidence
Code review	✅ No blockers	1 reviewer
Linked issue	✅ Linked	#2553
Related work	✅ No active overlap found	No same-issue or scoped active PR overlap found.
Change scope	✅ 20/20	Low review scope from cached public metadata (size label size:M; 1 linked issue).
Validation posture	✅ 25/25	PR body includes validation/test evidence.
Contributor workload	✅ 10/10	Author activity: 65 registered-repo PR(s), 55 merged, 529 issue(s).
Contributor context	✅ Confirmed Gittensor contributor	JSONbored; Gittensor profile; 65 PR(s), 529 issue(s).
Gate result	⚠️ Not blocking	Advisory; not blocking this PR.

Review context

• Author: JSONbored
• Role context: owner (maintainer lane)
• Public audience mode: oss maintainer
• Lane context: Repository registration is not available in the local Gittensory cache.
• Public profile languages: not available
• Official Gittensor activity: 65 PR(s), 529 issue(s).
• PR-specific overlap: none found.

Contributor next steps

• Treat this as maintainer-lane context rather than normal contributor-lane activity.
• No action.

Signal definitions

• Related work = same linked issue, overlapping active PRs, or title/path similarity.
• Change scope = cached public metadata such as size labels, draft state, and review-burden hints.
• Validation posture = whether the PR provides enough public validation/test evidence for maintainer review.
• Contributor workload = public contributor activity and cleanup pressure, not a repo-wide quality failure.
• Contributor context = public GitHub/Gittensor identity context; non-Gittensor status is not a blocker.

_{🟩 Safe / merged · 🟦 Advisory · 🟨 Held for review · 🟥 Blocked / closed}

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[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 96.03%. Comparing base (c4b797b) to head (dc1496c).
⚠️ Report is 2 commits behind head on main.
✅ All tests successful. No failed tests found.

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##             main    #2613   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   96.02%   96.03%           
=======================================
  Files         233      233           
  Lines       26077    26096   +19     
  Branches     9474     9481    +7     
=======================================
+ Hits        25041    25060   +19     
  Misses        425      425           
  Partials      611      611           

Files with missing lines	Coverage Δ
src/review/safety.ts	100.00% <ø> (ø)
src/review/secrets-scan.ts	100.00% <100.00%> (ø)

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