diff --git a/src/settings/autonomy.ts b/src/settings/autonomy.ts
index af1e91adf1..030df6d75d 100644
--- a/src/settings/autonomy.ts
+++ b/src/settings/autonomy.ts
@@ -1,93 +1,5 @@
-import type { AgentActionClass, AutoMaintainPolicy, AutoMergeMethod, AutonomyLevel, AutonomyPolicy } from "../types";
-
-// The graduated autonomy dial (#773), ordered least → most autonomous. Every later agent-layer phase reads
-// this BEFORE acting. `observe` is the deny-by-default floor — loopover watches but never takes an action.
-// (#4620: `suggest`/`propose` removed -- both were 100% behaviorally identical to `observe`, see
-// AutonomyLevel's own doc comment.)
-export const AUTONOMY_LEVELS = ["observe", "auto_with_approval", "auto"] as const;
-
-// The write-action classes the maintainer auto-maintain layer (#778) can take on a PR. `review_state_label`
-// (#label-scoping) is a separate class from `label`: it gates the planner's own disposition-communication
-// labels (ready-to-merge / changes-requested / manual-review / migration-collision / pending-closure /
-// new-account), independent of the anti-abuse enforcement labels (blacklist/contributor-cap/review-nag), which
-// ride on `close` instead -- see agent-actions.ts. `assign` (#3182) is its own independent class, same shape:
-// best-effort assignment of the PR's opening contributor, unrelated to merge/close/approve.
-export const AGENT_ACTION_CLASSES = ["review", "request_changes", "approve", "merge", "close", "label", "review_state_label", "update_branch", "assign"] as const;
-
-// Deny-by-default: any action class with no explicit, valid level resolves to this.
-export const DEFAULT_AUTONOMY_LEVEL: AutonomyLevel = "observe";
-
-const AUTONOMY_LEVEL_SET = new Set<string>(AUTONOMY_LEVELS);
-
-/**
- * Resolve the configured autonomy level for one action class on a repo. THE single gate the action layer
- * (#778) consults before any write action. Deny-by-default: an unset (or malformed) action class is
- * `observe` — loopover observes but never acts. Pure.
- */
-export function resolveAutonomy(autonomy: AutonomyPolicy | null | undefined, actionClass: AgentActionClass): AutonomyLevel {
-  return autonomy?.[actionClass] ?? DEFAULT_AUTONOMY_LEVEL;
-}
-
-/** True when the level permits the agent to actually execute the action (directly or behind an approval). */
-export function isActingAutonomyLevel(level: AutonomyLevel): boolean {
-  return level === "auto" || level === "auto_with_approval";
-}
-
-/**
- * True when a repo has opted into the agent layer at all — i.e. at least one action class has an acting
- * autonomy level. The deny-by-default floor (every class `observe`) is NOT configured. The scheduled
- * re-gate sweep (#777) uses this to skip repos that never asked the agent to act. Pure.
- */
-export function isAgentConfigured(autonomy: AutonomyPolicy | null | undefined): boolean {
-  return AGENT_ACTION_CLASSES.some((actionClass) => isActingAutonomyLevel(resolveAutonomy(autonomy, actionClass)));
-}
-
-/** True when the action must pass a human approval gate (#779) before it executes. */
-export function autonomyRequiresApproval(level: AutonomyLevel): boolean {
-  return level === "auto_with_approval";
-}
-
-/**
- * Parse/validate an arbitrary value into an AutonomyPolicy: keep only known action classes mapped to known
- * levels, drop everything else. Deny-by-default by omission. Used for the DB row, the API body, and the
- * `.loopover.yml` settings block. Pure.
- */
-export function normalizeAutonomyPolicy(input: unknown): AutonomyPolicy {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) return {};
-  const record = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const policy: AutonomyPolicy = {};
-  for (const actionClass of AGENT_ACTION_CLASSES) {
-    const value = record[actionClass];
-    if (typeof value === "string" && AUTONOMY_LEVEL_SET.has(value)) {
-      policy[actionClass] = value as AutonomyLevel;
-    }
-  }
-  return policy;
-}
-
-// Auto-maintain policy (#774): how an action behaves once its autonomy level permits acting.
-export const AUTO_MERGE_METHODS = ["merge", "squash", "rebase"] as const;
-const AUTO_MERGE_METHOD_SET = new Set<string>(AUTO_MERGE_METHODS);
-
-// Conservative defaults: squash (the tidiest history) + a single human approval before any auto-merge.
-export const DEFAULT_AUTO_MAINTAIN_POLICY: AutoMaintainPolicy = { requireApprovals: 1, mergeMethod: "squash" };
-
-// Approvals are clamped to a sane band so a malformed config can't disable the gate (negative) or stall it.
-const MAX_REQUIRE_APPROVALS = 10;
-
-/**
- * Parse/validate an arbitrary value into an AutoMaintainPolicy, filling the conservative defaults for any
- * missing/invalid field. `requireApprovals` is clamped to [0, 10]. Pure.
- */
-export function normalizeAutoMaintainPolicy(input: unknown): AutoMaintainPolicy {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) return { ...DEFAULT_AUTO_MAINTAIN_POLICY };
-  const record = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const rawApprovals = record.requireApprovals;
-  const requireApprovals =
-    typeof rawApprovals === "number" && Number.isFinite(rawApprovals)
-      ? Math.min(MAX_REQUIRE_APPROVALS, Math.max(0, Math.trunc(rawApprovals)))
-      : DEFAULT_AUTO_MAINTAIN_POLICY.requireApprovals;
-  const rawMethod = record.mergeMethod;
-  const mergeMethod = typeof rawMethod === "string" && AUTO_MERGE_METHOD_SET.has(rawMethod) ? (rawMethod as AutoMergeMethod) : DEFAULT_AUTO_MAINTAIN_POLICY.mergeMethod;
-  return { requireApprovals, mergeMethod };
-}
+// autonomy, converged onto @loopover/engine (#4879, extended by #6194). This src/ file was a hand-maintained twin of
+// the engine copy; it is now a thin re-export shim so the single implementation lives at
+// packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/autonomy.ts (imported via relative source path, not the published package, to
+// match this repo's existing engine-consumption convention — see src/signals/check-summary.ts).
+export * from "../../packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/autonomy";
diff --git a/src/settings/command-authorization.ts b/src/settings/command-authorization.ts
index f4039ee945..d62c2f7e94 100644
--- a/src/settings/command-authorization.ts
+++ b/src/settings/command-authorization.ts
@@ -1,270 +1,5 @@
-import type { CommandAuthorizationRole, RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy } from "../types";
-
-export const DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy = {
-  default: ["maintainer", "collaborator", "confirmed_miner"],
-  commands: {
-    "queue-summary": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "confirmed-miners": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "review-now": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "needs-author": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "duplicate-clusters": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "burden-forecast": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "intake-health": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "outcome-patterns": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "noise-report": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    "gate-override": ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    plan: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    // #4595/#5084: chat is Ollama-only grounded LLM generation, a materially larger surface than ask's
-    // deterministic-only answer, so v1 started maintainer/collaborator-only. #5084 widens this to the PR's
-    // OWN author (never an arbitrary commenter on someone else's PR) -- but ONLY when commandRateLimitPolicy
-    // is "hold" for the repo, enforced in evaluateCommandAuthorization below, not just by operator convention.
-    // Explicit registration here (rather than falling through to `default`) also activates the
-    // MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS clamp in normalizeCommandRoleList, so a self-hoster can't yml
-    // themselves into "any confirmed_miner" or similar widening beyond what's shipped here.
-    chat: ["maintainer", "collaborator", "pr_author"],
-    // #1960 PR control-surface verbs. "review" is deliberately widenable to confirmed_miner (same self-rerun
-    // precedent already applied to review-now, #824) — a confirmed miner may re-trigger review on their own PR.
-    // The rest (pause/resume/resolve/configuration/explain) are conservative maintainer/collaborator-only
-    // defaults out of the box; a maintainer who wants to widen them can do so via commandAuthorization overrides.
-    review: ["maintainer", "collaborator", "confirmed_miner"],
-    pause: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    resume: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    resolve: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    configuration: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    explain: ["maintainer", "collaborator"],
-    // #4195 (part of the #4189 E2E-test-generation epic): deliberately NARROWER than every command above --
-    // "maintainer" ONLY, excluding "collaborator" and "confirmed_miner". This command can write real content
-    // (a generated test) attributed to the PR; a repo could grant a contributor/miner collaborator-level
-    // push access, and that tier must not be able to invoke test generation for their own scored PR (the
-    // exact loophole a click-to-generate button would otherwise open). The existing
-    // `maintainer_command_requires_maintainer` guard below already denies the PR's own author when they
-    // don't independently hold the `maintainer` role, so no bespoke pr_author check is needed here.
-    "generate-tests": ["maintainer"],
-  },
-};
-
-const COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_ROLES = new Set<CommandAuthorizationRole>(["maintainer", "collaborator", "pr_author", "confirmed_miner"]);
-// Roles that may remain configured on a maintainer-only command. The clamp drops only the spoofable
-// plain `pr_author` role; `confirmed_miner` survives so a detected miner can self-trigger reruns (#824).
-const MAINTAINER_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_ROLES = new Set<CommandAuthorizationRole>(["maintainer", "collaborator", "confirmed_miner"]);
-const MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS = new Set(Object.keys(DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY.commands));
-// #5084: commands where a `pr_author` match is only actually granted when commandRateLimitPolicy is "hold" for
-// the repo -- checked in evaluateCommandAuthorization. Currently just `chat` (Ollama-only LLM generation);
-// deliberately a narrow, explicit allowlist rather than inferring this from isAiCostBearingCommand, so widening
-// it to another command later is a deliberate one-line addition, not an implicit side effect of an unrelated set.
-const PR_AUTHOR_RATE_LIMITED_COMMANDS = new Set(["chat"]);
-
-export type CommandAuthorizationDecision = {
-  authorized: boolean;
-  reason: string;
-  actorKind: "maintainer" | "author" | "none";
-  matchedRole: CommandAuthorizationRole | null;
-  allowedRoles: CommandAuthorizationRole[];
-};
-
-export function normalizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy(input: unknown): { policy: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy; warnings: string[] } {
-  const warnings: string[] = [];
-  if (!isRecord(input)) {
-    if (input !== null && input !== undefined) warnings.push("commandAuthorization must be an object; using secure defaults.");
-    return { policy: clonePolicy(DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY), warnings };
-  }
-
-  const defaultRoles = normalizeRoleList(input.default, DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY.default, "default", warnings);
-  const commands: Record<string, CommandAuthorizationRole[]> = { ...DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY.commands };
-  if (input.commands !== undefined) {
-    if (isRecord(input.commands)) {
-      for (const [command, roles] of Object.entries(input.commands)) {
-        const commandName = command.trim().toLowerCase();
-        if (!/^[a-z][a-z-]{0,63}$/.test(commandName)) {
-          warnings.push(`Ignored malformed command authorization key: ${command.slice(0, 64)}`);
-          continue;
-        }
-        commands[commandName] = normalizeCommandRoleList(commandName, normalizeRoleList(roles, defaultRoles, commandName, warnings), warnings);
-      }
-    } else {
-      warnings.push("commandAuthorization.commands must be an object; using command defaults.");
-    }
-  }
-
-  return { policy: { default: defaultRoles, commands }, warnings };
-}
-
-export function commandAuthorizationAllowedRoles(policy: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy | null | undefined, commandName: string): CommandAuthorizationRole[] {
-  const normalized = normalizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy(policy).policy;
-  // Policy command keys are stored normalized (trimmed + lowercased) by normalizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy,
-  // so the lookup MUST normalize the probe too. A raw mixed-case name (e.g. "Gate-Override") otherwise misses
-  // its restrictive override and silently falls back to the permissive default — under-stating the restriction.
-  const key = normalizeCommandName(commandName);
-  const commandRoles = Object.hasOwn(normalized.commands, key) ? normalized.commands[key] : undefined;
-  return dedupeRoles(commandRoles ?? normalized.default);
-}
-
-function normalizeCommandName(commandName: string): string {
-  return commandName.trim().toLowerCase();
-}
-
-export function commandAuthorizationNeedsMinerDetection(args: {
-  policy?: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy | null | undefined;
-  commandName: string;
-  commenterLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-  commenterAssociation?: string | null | undefined;
-  pullRequestAuthorLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-}): boolean {
-  const allowedRoles = commandAuthorizationAllowedRoles(args.policy, args.commandName);
-  if (!allowedRoles.includes("confirmed_miner")) return false;
-  if (!isSameLogin(args.commenterLogin, args.pullRequestAuthorLogin)) return false;
-  const rolesWithoutMiner = actorRoles({ ...args, minerStatus: undefined });
-  return !rolesWithoutMiner.some((role) => allowedRoles.includes(role));
-}
-
-export function evaluateCommandAuthorization(args: {
-  policy?: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy | null | undefined;
-  commandName: string;
-  commenterLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-  commenterAssociation?: string | null | undefined;
-  pullRequestAuthorLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-  minerStatus?: "confirmed" | "not_found" | "unavailable" | undefined;
-  /** #5084: required (must be `"hold"`) for a bare `pr_author` match to actually authorize a command in
-   *  {@link PR_AUTHOR_RATE_LIMITED_COMMANDS} (currently just `chat`) -- unset/`"off"` denies exactly as if
-   *  `pr_author` weren't in the allowed-roles list at all, so a repo that hasn't turned on rate limiting
-   *  never grants contributor chat access no matter what `chat`'s configured roles say. */
-  commandRateLimitPolicy?: "off" | "hold" | undefined;
-  /** #5092: ALSO required (must be `true`) for a bare `pr_author` match to authorize a command in
-   *  {@link PR_AUTHOR_RATE_LIMITED_COMMANDS} -- the per-PR rate-limit counter (`repoFullName#issueNumber#command`)
-   *  never resets or checks PR state, so without this a contributor could keep a fresh allowance forever by
-   *  reopening/reusing a closed PR or spamming cheap draft PRs. Caller-computed (e.g. `pr.state === "open" &&
-   *  !pr.isDraft`) so this function doesn't need to know GitHub's own state-string conventions. Unset/`false`
-   *  denies exactly like a missing rate-limit policy -- maintainers/collaborators are unaffected regardless
-   *  (this bounds the less-trusted pr_author tier, not already-trusted roles). */
-  pullRequestOpenAndNotDraft?: boolean | undefined;
-}): CommandAuthorizationDecision {
-  const allowedRoles = commandAuthorizationAllowedRoles(args.policy, args.commandName);
-  const roles = actorRoles(args);
-  const matchedRole = roles.find((role) => allowedRoles.includes(role)) ?? null;
-  const prAuthorGatedCommand = matchedRole === "pr_author" && PR_AUTHOR_RATE_LIMITED_COMMANDS.has(normalizeCommandName(args.commandName));
-  if (prAuthorGatedCommand && args.commandRateLimitPolicy !== "hold") {
-    return { authorized: false, reason: "pr_author_requires_rate_limiting", actorKind: "author", matchedRole: null, allowedRoles };
-  }
-  if (prAuthorGatedCommand && args.pullRequestOpenAndNotDraft !== true) {
-    return { authorized: false, reason: "pr_author_requires_open_pr", actorKind: "author", matchedRole: null, allowedRoles };
-  }
-  if (matchedRole) {
-    return {
-      authorized: true,
-      reason: authorizationReason(matchedRole),
-      actorKind: matchedRole === "maintainer" || matchedRole === "collaborator" ? "maintainer" : "author",
-      matchedRole,
-      allowedRoles,
-    };
-  }
-  const ownPrAuthor = isSameLogin(args.commenterLogin, args.pullRequestAuthorLogin);
-  if (ownPrAuthor && allowedRoles.includes("confirmed_miner")) {
-    return {
-      authorized: false,
-      reason: args.minerStatus === "unavailable" || !args.minerStatus ? "miner_detection_unavailable" : "pr_author_not_confirmed_miner",
-      actorKind: "author",
-      matchedRole: null,
-      allowedRoles,
-    };
-  }
-  if (ownPrAuthor && MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS.has(normalizeCommandName(args.commandName)) && allowedRoles.every((role) => role === "maintainer" || role === "collaborator")) {
-    return { authorized: false, reason: "maintainer_command_requires_maintainer", actorKind: "author", matchedRole: null, allowedRoles };
-  }
-  return {
-    authorized: false,
-    reason: ownPrAuthor ? "command_policy_denied" : "not_maintainer_or_pr_author",
-    actorKind: ownPrAuthor ? "author" : "none",
-    matchedRole: null,
-    allowedRoles,
-  };
-}
-
-export function summarizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy(policy: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy | null | undefined): {
-  defaultAllowed: CommandAuthorizationRole[];
-  commandOverrides: Array<{ command: string; allowedRoles: CommandAuthorizationRole[] }>;
-} {
-  const normalized = normalizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy(policy).policy;
-  return {
-    defaultAllowed: normalized.default,
-    commandOverrides: Object.entries(normalized.commands)
-      .map(([command, allowedRoles]) => ({ command, allowedRoles }))
-      .sort((left, right) => left.command.localeCompare(right.command)),
-  };
-}
-
-function normalizeCommandRoleList(commandName: string, roles: CommandAuthorizationRole[], warnings: string[]): CommandAuthorizationRole[] {
-  if (!MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS.has(commandName)) return roles;
-
-  // #5084: a role also survives the clamp if it's explicitly part of THIS command's own shipped default
-  // (chat's own default now includes pr_author) -- so a maintainer restating or narrowing a command's own
-  // default via yml never gets silently mangled, while every OTHER maintainer-only command whose own default
-  // excludes pr_author still can't have it added via override (this is a per-command union, not a blanket
-  // relaxation: the clamp still can't be conjured up on generate-tests/pause/etc.).
-  /* v8 ignore next -- defensive: MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS is derived from these keys, so a maintainer-only command always resolves a default list. */
-  const commandOwnDefaultRoles = DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY.commands[commandName] ?? [];
-  const allowedClampRoles = new Set<CommandAuthorizationRole>([...MAINTAINER_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_ROLES, ...commandOwnDefaultRoles]);
-  const maintainerRoles = roles.filter((role) => allowedClampRoles.has(role));
-  if (maintainerRoles.length === roles.length) return roles;
-
-  warnings.push(`Ignored author command authorization roles for maintainer-only command: ${commandName}.`);
-  if (maintainerRoles.length > 0) return dedupeRoles(maintainerRoles);
-  const defaultRoles = DEFAULT_COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY.commands[commandName];
-  /* v8 ignore next -- defensive: MAINTAINER_ONLY_DEFAULT_COMMANDS is derived from these keys, so a maintainer-only command always resolves a default list. */
-  return [...(defaultRoles ?? ["maintainer", "collaborator"])];
-}
-
-function actorRoles(args: {
-  commenterLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-  commenterAssociation?: string | null | undefined;
-  pullRequestAuthorLogin?: string | null | undefined;
-  minerStatus?: "confirmed" | "not_found" | "unavailable" | undefined;
-}): CommandAuthorizationRole[] {
-  const roles: CommandAuthorizationRole[] = [];
-  if (args.commenterAssociation === "OWNER" || args.commenterAssociation === "MEMBER") roles.push("maintainer");
-  if (args.commenterAssociation === "COLLABORATOR") roles.push("collaborator");
-  if (isSameLogin(args.commenterLogin, args.pullRequestAuthorLogin)) {
-    roles.push("pr_author");
-    if (args.minerStatus === "confirmed") roles.push("confirmed_miner");
-  }
-  return roles;
-}
-
-function normalizeRoleList(input: unknown, fallback: CommandAuthorizationRole[], label: string, warnings: string[]): CommandAuthorizationRole[] {
-  if (!Array.isArray(input)) {
-    if (input !== undefined) warnings.push(`commandAuthorization.${label} must be an array of roles; using fallback roles.`);
-    return dedupeRoles(fallback);
-  }
-  const roles = input.filter((role): role is CommandAuthorizationRole => {
-    const valid = typeof role === "string" && COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_ROLES.has(role as CommandAuthorizationRole);
-    if (!valid) warnings.push(`Ignored invalid command authorization role for ${label}.`);
-    return valid;
-  });
-  if (roles.length === 0) {
-    warnings.push(`commandAuthorization.${label} had no valid roles; using fallback roles.`);
-    return dedupeRoles(fallback);
-  }
-  return dedupeRoles(roles);
-}
-
-function dedupeRoles(roles: CommandAuthorizationRole[]): CommandAuthorizationRole[] {
-  return [...new Set(roles)];
-}
-
-function clonePolicy(policy: RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy): RepositoryCommandAuthorizationPolicy {
-  return { default: [...policy.default], commands: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(policy.commands).map(([command, roles]) => [command, [...roles]])) };
-}
-
-function authorizationReason(role: CommandAuthorizationRole): string {
-  if (role === "maintainer") return "maintainer_invocation";
-  if (role === "collaborator") return "collaborator_invocation";
-  if (role === "confirmed_miner") return "confirmed_miner_pr_author";
-  return "allowed_pr_author";
-}
-
-function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
-  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
-}
-
-function isSameLogin(left: string | null | undefined, right: string | null | undefined): boolean {
-  return Boolean(left && right && left.toLowerCase() === right.toLowerCase());
-}
+// command-authorization, converged onto @loopover/engine (#4879, extended by #6194). This src/ file was a
+// hand-maintained twin of the engine copy; it is now a thin re-export shim so the single implementation lives at
+// packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/command-authorization.ts (imported via relative source path, not the published
+// package, to match this repo's existing engine-consumption convention — see src/signals/check-summary.ts).
+export * from "../../packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/command-authorization";
diff --git a/src/settings/contributor-blacklist.ts b/src/settings/contributor-blacklist.ts
index 9a8d884077..9d5e81467a 100644
--- a/src/settings/contributor-blacklist.ts
+++ b/src/settings/contributor-blacklist.ts
@@ -1,91 +1,5 @@
-// Contributor blacklist (#1425, anti-abuse). Pure resolution + matching for the banned-login list the converged
-// engine acts on. Config-driven and layered the same as other settings (`.loopover.yml` > DB) and unioned with
-// the shared/global list at the point of use — NEVER hard-coded for any repo. Logins are public data; entries
-// may carry private maintainer metadata, so public surfaces must not echo it. Mirrors the shape of
-// command-authorization.ts (normalize → typed policy + warnings).
-import type { ContributorBlacklistEntry } from "../types";
-
-// GitHub logins: 1–39 chars, alphanumeric or single hyphens (not leading/trailing). Anything else is dropped so a
-// malformed entry can never widen the match or break the close path.
-const GITHUB_LOGIN = /^[a-zA-Z0-9](?:[a-zA-Z0-9]|-(?=[a-zA-Z0-9])){0,38}$/;
-const MAX_ENTRIES = 1000;
-const MAX_REASON_CHARS = 200;
-const MAX_EVIDENCE = 10;
-const MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS = 500;
-
-function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
-  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
-}
-
-/** Normalize a raw blacklist value (DB JSON or `.loopover.yml`) into validated, de-duplicated entries. Never
- *  throws: malformed entries are dropped with a warning. De-dup is by case-insensitive login (the FIRST wins, so
- *  its richer metadata is kept). */
-export function normalizeContributorBlacklist(input: unknown): { entries: ContributorBlacklistEntry[]; warnings: string[] } {
-  const warnings: string[] = [];
-  if (input === undefined || input === null) return { entries: [], warnings };
-  if (!Array.isArray(input)) {
-    warnings.push("contributorBlacklist must be a list of entries; ignoring it.");
-    return { entries: [], warnings };
-  }
-  const entries: ContributorBlacklistEntry[] = [];
-  const seen = new Set<string>();
-  for (const [index, raw] of input.entries()) {
-    if (entries.length >= MAX_ENTRIES) {
-      warnings.push(`contributorBlacklist is capped at ${MAX_ENTRIES} entries; dropping the rest.`);
-      break;
-    }
-    // Accept either a bare login string or a `{ login, ... }` object.
-    const record = typeof raw === "string" ? { login: raw } : raw;
-    if (!isRecord(record) || typeof record.login !== "string") {
-      warnings.push(`contributorBlacklist[${index}] needs a string login; ignoring it.`);
-      continue;
-    }
-    const login = record.login.trim();
-    if (!GITHUB_LOGIN.test(login)) {
-      warnings.push(`contributorBlacklist[${index}].login is not a valid GitHub login; ignoring it.`);
-      continue;
-    }
-    const key = login.toLowerCase();
-    if (seen.has(key)) continue; // first occurrence wins
-    seen.add(key);
-    const entry: ContributorBlacklistEntry = { login };
-    if (typeof record.reason === "string" && record.reason.trim().length > 0) entry.reason = record.reason.trim().slice(0, MAX_REASON_CHARS);
-    if (Array.isArray(record.evidence)) {
-      const evidence = record.evidence.filter((ref): ref is string => typeof ref === "string" && ref.trim().length > 0).map((ref) => ref.trim().slice(0, MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS)).slice(0, MAX_EVIDENCE);
-      if (evidence.length > 0) entry.evidence = evidence;
-    }
-    if (typeof record.addedAt === "string" && record.addedAt.trim().length > 0) entry.addedAt = record.addedAt.trim();
-    entries.push(entry);
-  }
-  return { entries, warnings };
-}
-
-/** The blacklist entry matching `login` (case-insensitive), or null. Tolerates an absent list (treated as empty)
- *  so callers can pass the optional `settings.contributorBlacklist` directly. */
-export function findBlacklistEntry(login: string | null | undefined, entries: ContributorBlacklistEntry[] | undefined): ContributorBlacklistEntry | null {
-  if (!login) return null;
-  const key = login.toLowerCase();
-  return (entries ?? []).find((entry) => entry.login.toLowerCase() === key) ?? null;
-}
-
-/** True iff `login` is on the resolved blacklist. */
-export function isAuthorBlacklisted(login: string | null | undefined, entries: ContributorBlacklistEntry[] | undefined): boolean {
-  return findBlacklistEntry(login, entries) !== null;
-}
-
-/** Union multiple blacklist sources (e.g. the shared/global list + the per-repo list) by case-insensitive login.
- *  A login on ANY source is blocked; the FIRST source's entry wins on a duplicate so earlier (more authoritative)
- *  metadata is preserved. Already-normalized inputs in, de-duplicated entries out. */
-export function mergeContributorBlacklists(...lists: ContributorBlacklistEntry[][]): ContributorBlacklistEntry[] {
-  const merged: ContributorBlacklistEntry[] = [];
-  const seen = new Set<string>();
-  for (const list of lists) {
-    for (const entry of list) {
-      const key = entry.login.toLowerCase();
-      if (seen.has(key)) continue;
-      seen.add(key);
-      merged.push(entry);
-    }
-  }
-  return merged;
-}
+// contributor-blacklist, converged onto @loopover/engine (#4879, extended by #6194). This src/ file was a
+// hand-maintained twin of the engine copy; it is now a thin re-export shim so the single implementation lives at
+// packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/contributor-blacklist.ts (imported via relative source path, not the published
+// package, to match this repo's existing engine-consumption convention — see src/signals/check-summary.ts).
+export * from "../../packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/contributor-blacklist";
diff --git a/src/settings/pr-type-label.ts b/src/settings/pr-type-label.ts
index 977c75bdee..1b0af75635 100644
--- a/src/settings/pr-type-label.ts
+++ b/src/settings/pr-type-label.ts
@@ -1,182 +1,5 @@
-// Neutral per-PR TYPE label (reviewbot src/core/auto-label.ts parity). The label CATEGORIES are a
-// config-driven, open `category -> label name` map (#label-modularity) — `bug`/`feature`/`priority` are
-// the built-in gittensor:* categories shipped as the DEFAULT config, not hardcoded engine assumptions:
-//   priority — ONLY when a linked/closing issue already carries the configured priority issue label
-//              (#priority-linked-issue-gate, `linkedIssueLabelPropagation`). Never inferred from title,
-//              changed files, AI output, or existing PR labels.
-//   feature  — genuine NEW functionality only (conventional-commit `feat`/`feature`).
-//   bug      — EVERYTHING ELSE: fix, test, docs, chore, refactor, perf, ci, build, style, revert.
-// A self-hoster can register a bounded number of ADDITIONAL categories in `typeLabels` beyond these three (e.g.
-// `security: "area:security"`) — an extra category is never chosen by title-classification (only bug/
-// feature are), only ever by a configured `linkedIssueLabelPropagation` mapping's `prLabel` (which can
-// target ANY string, registered in `typeLabels` or not); registering it here just makes it participate
-// in the mutual-exclusivity cleanup below, i.e. eligible for automatic removal when a PR's classification
-// moves away from it. Public + neutral categorization (NOT the reputation signal). Review-time +
-// independent of the gate / autonomy / dry-run (matches reviewbot, where auto-label runs at review
-// start). Fail-safe.
-import type { LinkedIssueLabelPropagationConfig, LinkedIssueLabelPropagationMapping, PrTypeLabelSet } from "../types";
-
-export type { PrTypeLabelSet } from "../types";
-
-/** The gittensor: namespace Gittensor itself uses -- an EXAMPLE default config, not an engine
- *  assumption (#label-modularity): a self-hoster's `typeLabels` fully replaces the category set these
- *  keys are drawn from. The built-in categories are mutually exclusive by default (see
- *  `resolvePrTypeLabel`'s `removeLabels`) unless a propagation mapping is explicitly additive. */
-export const DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS: PrTypeLabelSet = {
-  bug: "gittensor:bug",
-  feature: "gittensor:feature",
-  priority: "gittensor:priority",
-};
-
-export const MAX_TYPE_LABEL_CATEGORIES = 32;
-export const MAX_TYPE_LABEL_NAME_LENGTH = 50;
-
-const FEATURE_TITLE_ACTION_RE = /\b(add|adds|added|create|creates|created|enable|enables|enabled|implement|implements|implemented|integrate|integrates|integrated|introduce|introduces|introduced|launch|launches|launched|support|supports|supported|wire|wires|wired)\b/i;
-const FEATURE_TITLE_DOWNGRADE_RE = /\b(avoid|block|bug|bugfix|cache|classify|classifies|classifying|cleanup|clean-up|clean up|detect|detects|detecting|docs?|fix|format|guard|lint|normalize|recognize|recognizes|recognizing|refactor|regression|rename|test|tests|testing|tighten|typo)\b/i;
-
-/** feature ONLY for substantial new functionality: a feat/feature prefix plus a concrete add/support/enable
- *  action, with small recognition/classification/cleanup-style work downgraded to bug/work. EVERYTHING else —
- *  fix, test, docs, chore, refactor, perf, ci, build, style, revert — is bug. */
-export function deriveKindFromTitle(title: string | undefined): "bug" | "feature" {
-  const normalized = (title ?? "").trim();
-  const match = /^([a-zA-Z]+)/.exec(normalized);
-  const type = match?.[1]?.toLowerCase();
-  if (type !== "feat" && type !== "feature") return "bug";
-  const subject = normalized.replace(/^[a-zA-Z]+(?:\([^)]*\))?:?\s*/, "");
-  if (!FEATURE_TITLE_ACTION_RE.test(subject)) return "bug";
-  return FEATURE_TITLE_DOWNGRADE_RE.test(subject) ? "bug" : "feature";
-}
-
-/** Defaults-fill a per-repo `typeLabels` override (config-as-code), generic over an arbitrary set of
- *  categories (#label-modularity): every key of `DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS` (the built-in bug/feature/
- *  priority categories) is taken independently from `input` when it is a non-empty string, else falls
- *  back to the corresponding built-in default — so a repo can override just one built-in label name
- *  (e.g. only `priority`) and keep the others default. Any EXTRA key present in `input` beyond the
- *  built-in set (a self-hoster's own custom category, e.g. `security`) is included verbatim when
- *  valid, up to `MAX_TYPE_LABEL_CATEGORIES` total categories and GitHub's 50-character label-name
- *  limit; there is no built-in default for it to fall back to, so an invalid extra-category value is
- *  dropped entirely (warned, not defaulted) rather than silently defaulted. A non-object input yields
- *  the full default set; omitted is normal (no warning), present-but-wrong-shaped warns. An input that
- *  IS a valid object but has zero own keys (`{}`) also yields the full default set here — this
- *  function only ever defaults-fills or validates a COMPLETE settings value (the DB-persisted set, or
- *  a from-scratch construction); `resolveEffectiveSettings` (focus-manifest.ts) is what gives a
- *  manifest's *literal* `typeLabels: {}` its own distinct "deliberately zero categories" meaning,
- *  since collapsing that here would also flip every legacy `type_labels_json = '{}'` DB row (the SQL
- *  column's own default, predating any explicit customization) from full defaults to zero labels —
- *  the exact behavior change #priority-linked-issue-gate's migration promised existing repos would
- *  never see. Mirrors `normalizeCommandAuthorizationPolicy`'s defaults-fill pattern
- *  (`src/settings/command-authorization.ts`). */
-export function normalizeTypeLabelSet(input: unknown, warnings: string[]): PrTypeLabelSet {
-  if (input === undefined) return { ...DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS };
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) {
-    warnings.push("settings.typeLabels must be an object; using default label names.");
-    return { ...DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS };
-  }
-  const record = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const keys = new Set([...Object.keys(DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS), ...Object.keys(record)]);
-  const result: PrTypeLabelSet = {};
-  for (const key of keys) {
-    const value = record[key];
-    const wouldAddCategory = result[key] === undefined;
-    if (wouldAddCategory && Object.keys(result).length >= MAX_TYPE_LABEL_CATEGORIES) {
-      if (value !== undefined) warnings.push(`settings.typeLabels has more than ${MAX_TYPE_LABEL_CATEGORIES} categories; ignoring ${key}.`);
-      continue;
-    }
-    const builtInDefault: string | undefined = DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS[key];
-    if (typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 && value.trim().length <= MAX_TYPE_LABEL_NAME_LENGTH) {
-      result[key] = value.trim();
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (value !== undefined) {
-      const reason = typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > MAX_TYPE_LABEL_NAME_LENGTH ? `a non-empty string no longer than ${MAX_TYPE_LABEL_NAME_LENGTH} characters` : "a non-empty string";
-      warnings.push(
-        builtInDefault !== undefined
-          ? `settings.typeLabels.${key} must be ${reason}; using the default "${builtInDefault}".`
-          : `settings.typeLabels.${key} must be ${reason}; ignoring it.`,
-      );
-    }
-    // Reached for BOTH an invalid present value and an absent one -- a built-in category (bug/feature/
-    // priority) always has a default to fall back to; an unknown custom category does not, so it is
-    // dropped entirely (warned above when it was present-but-invalid, silently absent when never named).
-    if (builtInDefault !== undefined) result[key] = builtInDefault;
-  }
-  return result;
-}
-
-/** The pure decision `resolvePrTypeLabel` returns: which label(s) to apply, which configured
- *  type-label-set members to remove for mutual exclusivity, and why. */
-export type PrTypeLabelDecision = {
-  applyLabels: string[];
-  removeLabels: string[];
-  source: "propagation_exclusive" | "propagation_additive" | "title";
-};
-
-/**
- * Resolve the TYPE label decision for a PR.
- *  1. Linked-issue label PROPAGATION (config-driven, #priority-linked-issue-gate): when enabled, the
- *     LAST configured EXCLUSIVE mapping whose `issueLabel` appears (case-insensitively) among the
- *     ALREADY-FETCHED `linkedIssueLabels` wins (#5385 -- declare exclusive mappings in ascending
- *     precedence order). This is the ONLY way a label like `gittensor:priority`
- *     can ever be chosen — this function does no I/O and never infers it from title, changed files,
- *     AI output, or PR labels; the caller must fetch `linkedIssueLabels` itself (see
- *     `fetchLinkedIssueLabelsForPropagation` in `review/linked-issue-label-propagation-fetch.ts`).
- *     - `removeOtherTypeLabels: true` (exclusive) — the mapped label REPLACES the type label,
- *       exactly like today's bug/feature/priority classification (used for `gittensor:priority`).
- *     - `removeOtherTypeLabels: false` (additive) — the mapped label is applied ALONGSIDE the
- *       normal title-based bug/feature label, which is left untouched (e.g. a generic
- *       `customer:vip` → `triage:vip` triage marker that has nothing to do with bug/feature/priority).
- *  2. Otherwise, feature (feat/feature) / bug (everything else) by the conventional-commit title prefix
- *     -- ONLY when `labels` actually has a name registered for that built-in category; a configured set
- *     that omits `bug`/`feature` entirely (a self-hoster who only wants custom, propagation-driven
- *     categories, or an explicit `typeLabels: {}` resolved to zero categories) applies nothing for that
- *     branch rather than inventing a label name (#label-modularity).
- * `removeLabels` is always "every member of the configured type-label set that isn't one of
- * `applyLabels`" — generic and total over however many categories are configured, and safe even if a
- * misconfigured additive mapping's `prLabel` happens to collide with a type-label-set name (it is
- * excluded from removal since it is also being applied). Pure + total.
- */
-export function resolvePrTypeLabel(input: {
-  title: string | undefined;
-  linkedIssueLabels?: string[] | undefined;
-  labels?: PrTypeLabelSet | undefined;
-  propagation?: LinkedIssueLabelPropagationConfig | undefined;
-}): PrTypeLabelDecision {
-  const labels = input.labels ?? DEFAULT_TYPE_LABELS;
-  const isRealLabel = (label: string | undefined): label is string => typeof label === "string" && label.length > 0;
-  const typeLabelSet = Object.values(labels).filter(isRealLabel).filter((label) => label.length <= MAX_TYPE_LABEL_NAME_LENGTH).slice(0, MAX_TYPE_LABEL_CATEGORIES);
-  const titleLabel: string | undefined = labels[deriveKindFromTitle(input.title)];
-  const decide = (applyLabels: ReadonlyArray<string | undefined>, source: PrTypeLabelDecision["source"]): PrTypeLabelDecision => {
-    const apply = [...new Set(applyLabels.filter(isRealLabel))];
-    return { applyLabels: apply, removeLabels: typeLabelSet.filter((label) => !apply.includes(label)), source };
-  };
-
-  if (input.propagation?.enabled) {
-    const wanted = new Set((input.linkedIssueLabels ?? []).map((label) => label.toLowerCase()));
-    // Collect EVERY mapping the linked issue's labels satisfy, not just the first. An exclusive mapping
-    // (removeOtherTypeLabels: true -- e.g. bug/feature, genuinely mutually-exclusive categories) lets the
-    // LAST-configured match win, not the first (#5385 fix -- was first-match-wins, which meant a linked issue
-    // carrying BOTH gittensor:bug and gittensor:feature always resolved to bug, the lower-value label, purely
-    // because bug is declared before feature in `.loopover.yml`). Operators must declare exclusive mappings
-    // in ASCENDING precedence order (lowest-value category first, e.g. bug then feature) so the last match
-    // encountered while iterating is the highest-precedence one that actually applies -- this mirrors the
-    // repo's own default mapping order, which is already bug/feature/priority (ascending multiplier value).
-    // An additive mapping (e.g. priority -- a maintainer-hand-picked reward tag that coexists WITH whichever
-    // type already applies, not a type of its own) must compose with that winner instead of being skipped just
-    // because an earlier mapping in the array already matched. Before the original #priority-linked-issue-gate
-    // composition fix, an additive match was unreachable whenever the SAME linked issue also carried a label an
-    // earlier (exclusive) mapping matched -- the overwhelmingly common case for gittensor:priority, which is
-    // applied ALONGSIDE gittensor:bug/gittensor:feature on the issue, never instead of it.
-    let exclusiveMatch: LinkedIssueLabelPropagationMapping | undefined;
-    const additiveMatches: LinkedIssueLabelPropagationMapping[] = [];
-    for (const mapping of input.propagation.mappings) {
-      if (!wanted.has(mapping.issueLabel.toLowerCase())) continue;
-      if (mapping.removeOtherTypeLabels) exclusiveMatch = mapping;
-      else additiveMatches.push(mapping);
-    }
-    if (exclusiveMatch || additiveMatches.length > 0) {
-      const applyLabels = [exclusiveMatch ? exclusiveMatch.prLabel : titleLabel, ...additiveMatches.map((mapping) => mapping.prLabel)];
-      return decide(applyLabels, exclusiveMatch ? "propagation_exclusive" : "propagation_additive");
-    }
-  }
-  return decide([titleLabel], "title");
-}
+// pr-type-label, converged onto @loopover/engine (#4879, extended by #6194). This src/ file was a hand-maintained twin
+// of the engine copy; it is now a thin re-export shim so the single implementation lives at
+// packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/pr-type-label.ts (imported via relative source path, not the published package,
+// to match this repo's existing engine-consumption convention — see src/signals/check-summary.ts).
+export * from "../../packages/loopover-engine/src/settings/pr-type-label";
diff --git a/test/unit/check-engine-parity-script.test.ts b/test/unit/check-engine-parity-script.test.ts
index cbee0c4677..c72f993e92 100644
--- a/test/unit/check-engine-parity-script.test.ts
+++ b/test/unit/check-engine-parity-script.test.ts
@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@ describe("check-engine-parity script", () => {
 
   it("discovers real in-scope pairs in the repository (regression guard)", () => {
     const pairs = discoverEngineParityPairs({ root: process.cwd() });
-    expect(pairs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(14);
+    // Floor tracks the count of still-hand-duplicated in-scope twins, minus a small margin so unrelated
+    // additions don't trip it while a broken scanner returning ~0 still does. #6194 converged the last four
+    // settings twins (autonomy/command-authorization/contributor-blacklist/pr-type-label) onto their engine
+    // shims, so the floor drops from 14 to 10 — the `.some()` structural checks below are the real guard.
+    expect(pairs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(10);
     expect(pairs.some((pair: EngineParityPair) => pair.fileName === "guardrail-config.ts")).toBe(true);
     expect(pairs.some((pair: EngineParityPair) => pair.fileName === "change-guardrail.ts")).toBe(true);
     expect(pairs.some((pair: EngineParityPair) => pair.fileName === "duplicate-winner.ts")).toBe(false);