diff --git a/src/queue/processors.ts b/src/queue/processors.ts
index 7f32dfc58b..23245a77b5 100644
--- a/src/queue/processors.ts
+++ b/src/queue/processors.ts
@@ -1635,6 +1635,12 @@ async function maybeRunAgentMaintenance(
   const authorIsOwner =
     authorLogin.length > 0 &&
     authorLogin.toLowerCase() === repoOwner.toLowerCase();
+  // Fleet-operator identity (#2133): the same ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS allowlist already honored by the
+  // reopen-reclose path's hasMaintainerPermission, folded into the primary close-eligibility computation so an
+  // admin login (not the literal repo owner) gets the identical never-auto-closed exemption everywhere.
+  const authorIsAdmin =
+    authorLogin.length > 0 &&
+    parseGitHubLoginList(env.ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS).has(authorLogin.toLowerCase());
   const authorIsAutomationBot = isProtectedAutomationAuthor(pr.authorLogin);
 
   // Linked-issue HARD-RULE close (#linked-issue-hard-rules): when the repo enabled any rule, a body that links
@@ -1677,6 +1683,7 @@ async function maybeRunAgentMaintenance(
     changedPaths,
     hardGuardrailGlobs,
     authorIsOwner,
+    authorIsAdmin,
     authorIsAutomationBot,
     closeOwnerAuthors: settings.closeOwnerAuthors,
     ciState: ciAggregate.ciState,
@@ -3360,14 +3367,21 @@ async function processGitHubWebhook(
         const repoOwner = repoFullName.includes("/")
           ? repoFullName.slice(0, repoFullName.indexOf("/")).toLowerCase()
           : "";
+        const draftDodgeAuthorLogin = (pr.authorLogin ?? "").toLowerCase();
         const authorIsOwner =
-          (pr.authorLogin ?? "").toLowerCase() === repoOwner &&
-          repoOwner.length > 0;
+          draftDodgeAuthorLogin === repoOwner && repoOwner.length > 0;
+        // Fleet-operator identity (#2133): same ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS exemption as the primary close-eligibility
+        // computation above and hasMaintainerPermission below — an admin login must never be auto-closed here
+        // either, matching every other actuation path's trusted-operator definition.
+        const authorIsAdmin =
+          draftDodgeAuthorLogin.length > 0 &&
+          parseGitHubLoginList(env.ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS).has(draftDodgeAuthorLogin);
         if (
           block &&
           block.headSha === pr.headSha &&
           !block.overridden &&
-          !authorIsOwner
+          !authorIsOwner &&
+          !authorIsAdmin
         ) {
           // Respect the agent action mode (#killswitch-gap): the outer guard already excludes a per-repo pause,
           // but this close path must also honor the global freeze and dry-run — so a freeze is a COMPLETE stop
diff --git a/src/settings/agent-actions.ts b/src/settings/agent-actions.ts
index 93dfecb636..40e92f3a73 100644
--- a/src/settings/agent-actions.ts
+++ b/src/settings/agent-actions.ts
@@ -86,13 +86,20 @@ export type AgentActionPlanInput = {
   // True when the PR author is the repo owner (e.g. JSONbored). Standing rule: owner PRs are NEVER
   // auto-closed. They may still auto-merge when clean + passing.
   authorIsOwner: boolean;
+  // True when the PR author is a fleet-operator login (env ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS) that is NOT the literal repo
+  // owner (#2133). This is the same trusted-operator identity already honored by the reopen-reclose path's
+  // hasMaintainerPermission — folded in here so it isn't a second, drifting definition of "maintainer". Treated
+  // identically to authorIsOwner throughout this planner (never auto-closed by default; auto-close only when
+  // closeOwnerAuthors is on).
+  authorIsAdmin: boolean;
   // True when the PR author is a maintainer-managed automation account (e.g. github-actions[bot] opening an
   // accumulator like automation/readme-refresh, or dependabot/renovate). These are NEVER auto-closed — a noise
   // heuristic (duplicate/slop) must not kill a recurring maintainer-managed PR. They may still auto-merge.
   authorIsAutomationBot: boolean;
-  // Per-repo toggle (#configurable-owner-close): when TRUE, the repo OWNER's own PRs are eligible for auto-close
-  // like a contributor's (still gated by the `close` autonomy class + adverse-signal conditions). Default/undefined
-  // ⇒ owner PRs are exempt (merge or manual-hold only). Automation-bot PRs stay exempt regardless.
+  // Per-repo toggle (#configurable-owner-close): when TRUE, the repo OWNER's own PRs (and admin-authored PRs,
+  // #2133) are eligible for auto-close like a contributor's (still gated by the `close` autonomy class +
+  // adverse-signal conditions). Default/undefined ⇒ owner/admin PRs are exempt (merge or manual-hold only).
+  // Automation-bot PRs stay exempt regardless.
   closeOwnerAuthors?: boolean | undefined;
   // Live CI aggregate over ALL of the PR's checks — required OR not, including non-required ones like
   // codecov/patch and every commit-status (reviewbot parity). "passed" = every check completed and none
@@ -256,12 +263,13 @@ export function planAgentMaintenanceActions(input: AgentActionPlanInput): Planne
 
   // Contributor blacklist (#1425): a banned author's PR is a DETERMINISTIC short-circuit — it SHORT-CIRCUITS to a
   // label + close AHEAD of all merit/CI/gate/AI analysis (this returns before any of it), so a blocked account is
-  // never merit-reviewed or auto-merged. Fires for a CONTRIBUTOR only (owner/automation bots are NEVER auto-closed,
-  // the standing rule). Zero-hallucination, so its close is `closeKind: "blacklist"`, separate from heuristic
+  // never merit-reviewed or auto-merged. Fires for a CONTRIBUTOR only (owner/admin/automation bots are NEVER
+  // auto-closed, the standing rule — #2133 folds the fleet-operator admin allowlist into the same exemption).
+  // Zero-hallucination, so its close is `closeKind: "blacklist"`, separate from heuristic
   // closes. The `acting`/`approval` gates here + the executor's pause/dry-run/
   // kill-switch gate make it dry-run-able and approval-gated exactly like every other action. The close comment is
   // static by construction so private maintainer metadata from the blacklist entry cannot leak.
-  const blacklistContributor = !input.authorIsOwner && !input.authorIsAutomationBot;
+  const blacklistContributor = !input.authorIsOwner && !input.authorIsAdmin && !input.authorIsAutomationBot;
   if (input.blacklistMatch?.matched === true && blacklistContributor) {
     const label = input.blacklistLabel ?? DEFAULT_BLACKLIST_LABEL;
     if (acting("label")) actions.push({ actionClass: "label", requiresApproval: approval("label"), reason: "blacklisted contributor", label, labelOp: "add" });
@@ -312,12 +320,14 @@ export function planAgentMaintenanceActions(input: AgentActionPlanInput): Planne
   // would-approve/would-merge dispositions into a manual hold.
   const ciUnverified = input.ciState === "unverified";
   const reviewGood = gatePassing && ciPassed;
-  const isContributor = !input.authorIsOwner && !input.authorIsAutomationBot;
+  const isContributor = !input.authorIsOwner && !input.authorIsAdmin && !input.authorIsAutomationBot;
   // The owner-close exemption is PER-REPO CONFIGURABLE (#configurable-owner-close): by default the repo owner's
   // own PRs are exempt from auto-close (closeOwnerAuthors !== true ⇒ merge or manual-hold only), but a maintainer
-  // can opt in to closing them like a contributor's. Automation bots stay exempt regardless (a noise heuristic
-  // must not kill a recurring maintainer-managed accumulator).
-  const closeEligible = isContributor || (input.authorIsOwner && input.closeOwnerAuthors === true);
+  // can opt in to closing them like a contributor's. #2133 folds the fleet-operator admin allowlist into the same
+  // trusted-identity exemption (a login honored as a maintainer everywhere else in the codebase must not be
+  // treated as an ordinary contributor here). Automation bots stay exempt regardless (a noise heuristic must not
+  // kill a recurring maintainer-managed accumulator).
+  const closeEligible = isContributor || ((input.authorIsOwner || input.authorIsAdmin) && input.closeOwnerAuthors === true);
   const mergeableClean = input.pr.mergeableState === "clean";
   const isConflict = input.pr.mergeableState === "dirty"; // conflicts with base — can't merge as-is
   // RC3: a prior merge attempt failed terminally for THIS exact head SHA (403/405/409/conflict) → never re-plan
diff --git a/test/unit/agent-actions.test.ts b/test/unit/agent-actions.test.ts
index 50bcb42369..08fbfa7668 100644
--- a/test/unit/agent-actions.test.ts
+++ b/test/unit/agent-actions.test.ts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ function input(overrides: Partial<AgentActionPlanInput> & { conclusion: GateChec
     changedPaths: [],
     hardGuardrailGlobs: [],
     authorIsOwner: false,
+    authorIsAdmin: false,
     authorIsAutomationBot: false,
     ciState: "passed",
     pr: { labels: [] },
@@ -135,12 +136,12 @@ describe("planAgentMaintenanceActions (#778)", () => {
 
   it("applies conservative defaults when autoMaintain / slopGateMinScore are omitted", () => {
     // no autoMaintain → requireApprovals defaults to 1 → a clean passing PR without APPROVED does NOT merge
-    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "success", blockerTitles: [], autonomy: { merge: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], mergeableState: "clean" } }))).not.toContain("merge");
+    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "success", blockerTitles: [], autonomy: { merge: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAdmin: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], mergeableState: "clean" } }))).not.toContain("merge");
     // no slopGateMinScore → defaults to 60 → slopRisk 70 counts as noise and closes
-    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "failure", blockerTitles: ["x"], autonomy: { close: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 70 } }))).toContain("close");
+    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "failure", blockerTitles: ["x"], autonomy: { close: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAdmin: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 70 } }))).toContain("close");
     // ...and slopRisk 50 (below the slop default) STILL closes — a failing-gate contributor PR is closed one-shot
     // regardless of slop; the slop score only adds a close reason (minimize-manual: merge-or-close).
-    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "failure", blockerTitles: ["x"], autonomy: { close: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 50 } }))).toContain("close");
+    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions({ conclusion: "failure", blockerTitles: ["x"], autonomy: { close: "auto" }, changedPaths: [], hardGuardrailGlobs: [], authorIsOwner: false, authorIsAdmin: false, authorIsAutomationBot: false, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 50 } }))).toContain("close");
   });
 
   it("closes any non-passing contributor PR (citing noise when present), and never closes a passing PR", () => {
@@ -371,6 +372,28 @@ describe("planAgentMaintenanceActions (#778)", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  describe("admin-login guard: ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS gets the same never-auto-close exemption as the owner (#2133)", () => {
+    it("does NOT auto-close a noisy failing PR authored by a fleet-operator admin login", () => {
+      const plan = classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(input({ conclusion: "failure", autonomy: { close: "auto" }, blockerTitles: ["x"], authorIsAdmin: true, pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 95 } })));
+      expect(plan).not.toContain("close");
+    });
+
+    it("still auto-merges a clean+approved admin-authored PR (the guard blocks only close, never merge)", () => {
+      const plan = classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(input({ conclusion: "success", autonomy: { merge: "auto" }, authorIsAdmin: true, pr: { labels: [], mergeableState: "clean", reviewDecision: "APPROVED" } })));
+      expect(plan).toContain("merge");
+    });
+
+    it("DOES auto-close a failing admin PR when closeOwnerAuthors is enabled (the same per-repo opt-in covers admins)", () => {
+      const plan = classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(input({ conclusion: "failure", autonomy: { close: "auto" }, blockerTitles: ["x"], authorIsAdmin: true, closeOwnerAuthors: true, ciState: "passed", pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 95 } })));
+      expect(plan).toContain("close");
+    });
+
+    it("does NOT auto-close a red-CI PR authored by an admin login (mirrors the CI-policy owner exemption)", () => {
+      const plan = classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(input({ conclusion: "success", autonomy: { close: "auto", request_changes: "auto", label: "auto" }, ciState: "failed", failingCheckNames: ["codecov/patch"], authorIsAdmin: true, pr: { labels: [] } })));
+      expect(plan).not.toContain("close");
+    });
+  });
+
   describe("automation-bot guard: never auto-close maintainer-managed accumulator/dependency PRs", () => {
     it("does NOT auto-close a noisy failing PR authored by an automation bot (e.g. the readme-refresh accumulator)", () => {
       const plan = classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(input({ conclusion: "failure", autonomy: { close: "auto" }, blockerTitles: ["x"], authorIsAutomationBot: true, pr: { labels: [], slopRisk: 95, linkedDuplicateCount: 3 } })));
@@ -714,8 +737,11 @@ describe("contributor blacklist short-circuit (#1425)", () => {
     expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(blacklisted({ ciState: "pending" })))).toEqual(["label", "close"]);
   });
 
-  it("NEVER fires for the owner or an automation bot (standing rule) — the PR falls through to normal disposition", () => {
+  it("NEVER fires for the owner, an admin login, or an automation bot (standing rule) — the PR falls through to normal disposition", () => {
     expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(blacklisted({ authorIsOwner: true })))).not.toContain("close");
+    // #2133: a fleet-operator ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS author gets the identical exemption — the blacklist
+    // short-circuit must not treat a trusted admin as an ordinary contributor.
+    expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(blacklisted({ authorIsAdmin: true })))).not.toContain("close");
     expect(classes(planAgentMaintenanceActions(blacklisted({ authorIsAutomationBot: true })))).not.toContain("close");
   });
 
diff --git a/test/unit/queue.test.ts b/test/unit/queue.test.ts
index ec69054c93..e564ef5371 100644
--- a/test/unit/queue.test.ts
+++ b/test/unit/queue.test.ts
@@ -9573,6 +9573,25 @@ describe("converted_to_draft gate-close (draft-dodge prevention)", () => {
     expect(calls.some((c) => c.includes("PATCH") && c.includes("/pulls/42"))).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  it("no-ops when the PR author is an ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS fleet-operator, not just the literal repo owner (#2133)", async () => {
+    const calls: string[] = [];
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      const url = input.toString();
+      calls.push(`${init?.method ?? "GET"} ${url}`);
+      if (url.includes("/access_tokens")) return Response.json({ token: "t" });
+      return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
+    });
+
+    const env = createTestEnv({ GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY: generateRsaPrivateKeyPem(), GITHUB_APP_SLUG: "gittensory", ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS: "admin-user" });
+    await setupRepo(env);
+    await recordGateBlockOutcome(env, { repoFullName: "JSONbored/gittensory", pullNumber: 42, headSha: "abc123", blockerCodes: ["missing_linked_issue"] });
+
+    // Author = "admin-user" ≠ repo owner "JSONbored", but IS in ADMIN_GITHUB_LOGINS → no close.
+    await processJob(env, { type: "github-webhook", deliveryId: "draft-admin", eventName: "pull_request", payload: draftPayload("admin-user") });
+
+    expect(calls.some((c) => c.includes("PATCH") && c.includes("/pulls/42"))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("no-ops when the agent is paused (agentPaused=true)", async () => {
     const calls: string[] = [];
     vi.stubGlobal("fetch", async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {